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Abstract—Researchers have proposed formal definitions of
quantitative information flow based on information theoretic
notions such as the Shannon entropy, the min entropy, the
guessing entropy, and channel capacity. This paper investigates
the hardness and possibilities of precisely checking and infer-
ring quantitative information flow according to such definitions.
We prove that, even for just comparing two programs on
which has the larger flow, none of the definitions is a k-
safety property for any k, and therefore is not amenable
to the self-composition technique that has been successfully
applied to precisely checking non-interference. We also show
a complexity theoretic gap with non-interference by proving
that, for loop-free boolean programs whose non-interference is
coNP-complete, the comparison problem is #P-hard for all of
the definitions.
For positive results, we show that universally quantifying the
distribution in the comparison problem, that is, comparing two
programs according to the entropy based definitions on which
has the larger flow for all distributions, is a 2-safety problem
in general and is coNP-complete when restricted for loop-free
boolean programs. We prove this by showing that the problem
is equivalent to a simple relation naturally expressing the fact
that one program is more secure than the other. We prove that
the relation also refines the channel-capacity based definition,
and that it can be precisely checked via the self-composition
as well as the “interleaved” self-composition technique.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider programs containing high security inputs and
low security outputs. Informally, the quantitative information
flow problem concerns the amount of information that an
attacker can learn about the high security input by executing
the program and observing the low security output. The
problem is motivated by applications in information security.
We refer to the classic by Denning [12] for an overview.
In essence, quantitative information flow measures how
secure, or insecure, a program is. Thus, unlike non-
interference [14], that only tells whether a program is
completely secure or not completely secure, a definition of
quantitative information flow must be able to distinguish two
programs that are both interferent but have different degrees
of “secureness.”
For example, consider the following two programs:
M1 ≡ if H = g then O := 0 else O := 1
M2 ≡ O := H
In both programs, H is a high security input and O is
a low security output. Viewing H as a password, M1 is
a prototypical login program that checks if the guess g
matches the password.1 By executing M1, an attacker only
learns whether H is equal to g, whereas she would be able
to learn the entire content of H by executing M2. Hence, a
reasonable definition of quantitative information flow should
assign a higher quantity to M2 than to M1, whereas non-
interference would merely say that M1 and M2 are both
interferent, assuming that there are more than one possible
value of H .
Researchers have attempted to formalize the definition of
quantitative information flow by appealing to information
theory. This has resulted in definitions based on the Shannon
entropy [12], [7], [19], the min entropy [29], the guessing
entropy [16], [1], and channel capacity [22], [20], [26].
Much of the previous research has focused on information
theoretic properties of the definitions and approximate (i.e.,
incomplete and/or unsound) algorithms for checking and
inferring quantitative information flow according to such
definitions.
In this paper, we give a verification theoretic and com-
plexity theoretic analysis of quantitative information flow
and investigate precise methods for checking quantitative
information flow. In particular, we study the following com-
parison problem: Given two programs M1 and M2, decide
if X (M1) ≤ X (M2). Here X (M) denotes the information
flow quantity of the program M according to the quantitative
information flow definition X where X is either SE [µ]
(Shannon-entropy based with distribution µ), ME [µ] (min-
entropy based with distribution µ), GE [µ] (guessing-entropy
based with distribution µ), or CC (channel-capacity based).
Note that, obviously, the comparison problem is no harder
than actually computing the quantitative information flow as
we can compare the two numbers once we have computed
X (M1) and X (M2).
Concretely, we show the following negative results, where
X is CC , SE [µ], ME [µ], or GE [µ] with µ uniform.
• Checking if X (M1) ≤ X (M2) is not a k-safety
1Here, for simplicity, we assume that g is a program constant. See
Section II for modeling attacker/user (i.e., low security) inputs.
property [30], [9] for any k.
• Restricted to loop-free boolean programs, checking if
X (M1) ≤ X (M2) is #P-hard.
The results are in stark contrast to non-interference which
is known to be a 2-safety property in general [3], [11]
(technically, for the termination-insensitive case2) and can be
shown to be coNP-complete for loop-free boolean programs
(proved in Section III-C). (#P is known to be as hard as the
entire polynomial hierarchy [31].) The results suggest that
precisely inferring (i.e., computing) quantitative information
flow according to these definitions would be harder than
checking non-interference and may require a very different
approach (i.e., not self composition [3], [11], [30]).
We also give the following positive results which show
checking if the quantitative information flow of one program
is larger than the other for all distributions according to the
entropy-based definitions is easier. Below, Y is SE , ME , or
GE .
• Checking if ∀µ.Y[µ](M1) ≤ Y[µ](M2) is a 2-safety
property.
• Restricted to loop-free boolean programs, checking if
∀µ.Y[µ](M1) ≤ Y[µ](M2) is coNP-complete.
These results are proven by showing that the prob-
lems ∀µ.SE [µ](M1) ≤ SE [µ](M2), ∀µ.ME [µ](M1) ≤
ME [µ](M2), and ∀µ.GE [µ](M1) ≤ GE [µ](M2) are all
actually equivalent to a simple 2-safety relation R(M1,M2).
We also show that this relation refines the channel-capacity
based quantitative information flow, that is, if R(M1,M2)
then CC (M1) ≤ CC (M2).
The fact that R(M1,M2) is a 2-safety property implies
that it can be reduced to a safety problem via self compo-
sition. This leads to a new approach to precisely checking
quantitative information flow that leverages recent advances
in automated software verification [2], [15], [24], [4]. Briefly,
given M1 and M2, R(M1,M2) means that M1 is at least
as secure as M2 for all distributions while ¬R(M1,M2)
means that there must be a distribution in which M1 is less
secure than M2, according to the entropy-based definitions
of quantitative information flow. Therefore, by deciding
R(M1,M2), we can measure the security of the program
M1 relative to another specification program M2. Note that
this is useful even when M1 and M2 are “incomparable”
by R, that is, when ¬R(M1,M2) and ¬R(M2,M1). See
Section IV-B for the details.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews the existing information-theoretic definitions of
quantitative information flow. Section III proves the hardness
of their comparison problems and thus shows the hardness of
precisely inferring quantitative information flow according
to these definitions. Section IV introduces the relation R
2We restrict to terminating programs in this paper. (The termination
assumption is nonrestrictive because we assume safety verification as a
blackbox routine.)
and proves it equivalent to the comparison problems for
the entropy-based definitions with their distributions uni-
versally quantified. The section also shows that this is a
2-safety property and is easier to decide than the non-
universally-quantified comparison problems, and suggests
a self-composition based method for precisely checking
quantitative information flow. Section V discusses related
work, and Section VI concludes. Appendix A contains the
supporting lemmas and definitions for the proofs appearing
in the main text. The omitted proofs appear in Appendix B.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We introduce the information theoretic definitions of
quantitative information flow that have been proposed in
literature. First, we review the notion of the Shannon en-
tropy [28], H[µ](X), which is the average of the informa-
tion content, and intuitively, denotes the uncertainty of the
random variable X .
Definition 2.1 (Shannon Entropy): Let X be a random
variable with sample space X and µ be a probability
distribution associated with X (we write µ explicitly for
clarity). The Shannon entropy of X is defined as
H[µ](X) =
∑
x∈X
µ(X = x) log
1
µ(X = x)
(The logarithm is in base 2.)
Next, we define conditional entropy. Informally, the condi-
tional entropy of X given Y denotes the uncertainty of X
after knowing Y .
Definition 2.2 (Conditional Entropy): Let X and Y be
random variables with sample spaces X and Y, respectively,
and µ be a probability distribution associated with X and
Y . Then, the conditional entropy of X given Y , written
H[µ](X |Y ) is defined as
H[µ](X |Y ) =
∑
y∈Y
µ(Y = y)H[µ](X |Y = y)
where
H[µ](X |Y = y)
=
∑
x∈X µ(X = x|Y = y) log
1
µ(X=x|Y=y)
µ(X = x|Y = y) = µ(X=x,Y=y)
µ(Y=y)
Next, we define (conditional) mutual information. Intu-
itively, the conditional mutual information of X and Y
given Z represents the mutual dependence of X and Y after
knowing Z .
Definition 2.3 (Mutual Information): Let X,Y and Z
be random variables and µ be an associated probability
distribution.3 Then, the conditional mutual information of
X and Y given Z is defined as
I[µ](X ;Y |Z) = H[µ](X |Z)−H[µ](X |Y, Z)
= H[µ](Y |Z)−H[µ](Y |X,Z)
3We abbreviate sample spaces of random variables when they are clear
from the context.
Let M be a program that takes a high security input H and
a low security input L, and gives the low security output O.
For simplicity, we restrict to programs with just one variable
of each kind, but it is trivial to extend the formalism to
multiple variables (e.g., by letting the variables range over
tuples). Also, for the purpose of the paper, unobservable
(i.e., high security) outputs are irrelevant, and so we assume
that the only program output is the low security output.
Let µ be a probability distribution over the values of H
and L. Then, the semantics of M can be defined by the
following probability equation. (We restrict to terminating
deterministic programs in this paper.)
µ(O = o) =
∑
h, ℓ ∈ H,L
M(h, ℓ) = o
µ(H = h, L = ℓ)
Note that we write M(h, ℓ) to denote the low security output
of the program M given inputs h and ℓ. Now, we are
ready to introduce the Shannon-entropy based definition of
quantitative information flow (QIF) [12], [7], [19].
Definition 2.4 (Shannon-Entropy-based QIF): Let M
be a program with high security input H , low security input
L, and low security output O. Let µ be a distribution over
H and L. Then, the Shannon-entropy-based quantitative
information flow is defined
SE [µ](M) = I[µ](O;H |L)
= H[µ](H |L)−H[µ](H |O,L)
Intuitively, H[µ](H |L) denotes the initial uncertainty know-
ing the low security input and H[µ](H |O,L) denotes the
remaining uncertainty after knowing the low security output.
As an example, consider the programs M1 and M2 from
Section I. For concreteness, assume that g is the value 01
and H ranges over the space {00, 01, 10, 11}. Let U be the
uniform distribution over {00, 01, 10, 11}, that is, U(h) =
1/4 for all h ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}. The results are as follows.
SE [U ](M1) = H[U ](H)−H[U ](H |O)
= log 4− 34 log 3
≈ .81128
SE [U ](M2) = H[U ](H)−H[U ](H |O)
= log 4− log 1
= 2
Consequently, we have that SE [U ](M1) ≤ SE [U ](M2), but
SE [U ](M2) 6≤ SE [U ](M1). That is, M1 is more secure
than M2 (according to the Shannon-entropy based definition
with uniformly distributed inputs), which agrees with our
intuition.
Let us recall the notion of non-interference [10], [14].
Definition 2.5 (Non-intereference): A program M is
said to be non-interferent iff for any h, h′ ∈ H and ℓ ∈ L,
M(h, ℓ) =M(h′, ℓ).
It is worth noting that non-interference can be formalized
as a special case of the Shannon-entropy based quantitative
information flow where the flow quantity is zero.
Theorem 2.6: Let M be a program that takes high-
security input H , low-security input L, and returns low-
security output O. Then, M is non-interferent if and only if
∀µ.SE [µ](M) = 0.
The above theorem is complementary to the one proven by
Clark et al. [5] which states that for any µ such that µ(H =
h, L = ℓ) > 0 for all h ∈ H and ℓ ∈ L, SE [µ](M) = 0 iff
M is non-interferent.
Next, we introduce the min entropy, which Smith [29]
recently suggested as an alternative measure for quantitative
information flow.
Definition 2.7 (Min Entropy): Let X and Y be random
variables, and µ be an associated probability distribution.
Then, the min entropy of X is defined
H∞[µ](X) = log
1
V [µ](X)
and the conditional min entropy of X given Y is defined
H∞[µ](X |Y ) = log
1
V [µ](X |Y )
where
V [µ](X) = maxx∈X µ(X = x)
V [µ](X |Y = y) = maxx∈X µ(X = x|Y = y)
V [µ](X |Y ) =
∑
y∈Y µ(Y = y)V [µ](X |Y = y)
Intuitively, V [µ](X) represents the highest probability that
an attacker guesses X in a single try. We now define the min-
entropy-based definition of quantitative information flow.
Definition 2.8 (Min-Entropy-based QIF): Let M be a
program with high security input H , low security input L,
and low security output O. Let µ be a distribution over H
and L. Then, the min-entropy-based quantitative information
flow is defined
ME [µ](M) = H∞[µ](H |L)−H∞[µ](H |O,L)
Whereas Smith [29] focused on programs lacking low
security inputs, we extend the definition to programs with
low security inputs in the definition above. It is easy to
see that our definition coincides with Smith’s for programs
without low security inputs. Also, the extension is arguably
natural in the sense that we simply take the conditional
entropy with respect to the distribution over the low security
inputs.
Computing the min-entropy based quantitative informa-
tion flow for our running example programs M1 and M2
from Section I with the uniform distribution, we obtain,
ME [U ](M1) = H∞[U ](H)−H∞[U ](H |O)
= log 4− log 2
= 1
ME [U ](M2) = H∞[U ](H)−H∞[U ](H |O)
= log 4− log 1
= 2
Again, we have that ME [U ](M1) ≤ ME [U ](M2) and
ME [U ](M2) 6≤ ME [U ](M1), and so M2 is deemed less
secure than M1.
The third definition of quantitative information flow
treated in this paper is the one based on the guessing
entropy [21], that is also recently proposed in literature [16],
[1].
Definition 2.9 (Guessing Entropy): Let X and Y be
random variables, and µ be an associated probability dis-
tribution. Then, the guessing entropy of X is defined
G[µ](X) =
∑
1≤i≤m
i× µ(X = xi)
where {x1, x2, . . . , xm} = X and ∀i, j.i ≤ j ⇒ µ(X =
xi) ≥ µ(X = xj).
The conditional guessing entropy of X given Y is defined
G[µ](X |Y ) =
∑
y∈Y
µ(Y = y)
∑
1≤i≤m
i× µ(X = xi|Y = y)
where {x1, x2, . . . , xm} = X and ∀i, j.i ≤ j ⇒ µ(X =
xi|Y = y) ≥ µ(X = xj |Y = y).
Intuitively, G[µ](X) represents the average number of
times required for the attacker to guess the value of X . We
now define the guessing-entropy-based quantitative informa-
tion flow.
Definition 2.10 (Guessing-Entropy-based QIF):
Let M be a program with high security input H , low
security input L, and low security output O. Let µ be a
distribution over H and L. Then, the guessing-entropy-
based quantitative information flow is defined
GE [µ](M) = G[µ](H |L)− G[µ](H |O,L)
Like with the min-entropy-based definition, the previous
research on guessing-entropy-based quantitative information
flow only considered programs without low security in-
puts [16], [1]. But, it is easy to see that our definition with
low security inputs coincides with the previous definitions
for programs without low security inputs. Also, as with
the extension for the min-entropy-based definition, it simply
takes the conditional entropy over the low security inputs.
We test GE on the running example from Section I by
calculating the quantities for the programs M1 and M2 with
the uniform distribution.
GE [U ](M1) = G[U ](H)− G[U ](H |O)
= 52 −
7
4
= 0.75
GE [U ](M2) = G[U ](H)− G[U ](H |O)
= 52 − 1
= 1.5
Therefore, we again have that GE [U ](M1) ≤ GE [U ](M2)
and GE [U ](M2) 6≤ GE [U ](M1), and so M2 is considered
less secure than M1, even with the guessing-entropy based
definition with the uniform distribution.
The fourth and the final existing definition of quantitative
information flow that we introduce in this paper is the one
based on channel capacity [22], [20], [26], which is simply
defined to be the maximum of the Shannon-entropy based
quantitative information flow over the distribution.
Definition 2.11 (Channel-Capacity-based QIF):
Let M be a program with high security input H , low
security input L, and low security output O. Then, the
channel-capacity-based quantitative information flow is
defined
CC (M) = max
µ
I[µ](O;H |L)
Unlike the Shannon-entropy based, the min-entropy
based, and the guessing-entropy based definitions, the
channel-capacity based definition of quantitative information
flow is not parameterized by a distribution over the inputs.
As with the other definitions, let us test the definition on the
running example from Section I by calculating the quantities
for the programs M1 and M2:
CC (M1) = maxµ I[µ](O;H)
= 1
CC (M2) = maxµ I[µ](O;H)
= 2
As with the entropy-based definitions (with the uniform
distribution), we have that CC (M1) ≤ CC (M2) and
CC (M2) 6≤ CC (M1), that is, the channel-capacity based
quantitative information flow also says that M2 is less secure
than M1.
III. HARDNESS OF COMPARISON PROBLEMS
We investigate the hardness of deciding the following
comparison problem CSE [µ]: Given programs M1 and M2
having the same input domain, decide if SE [µ](M1) ≤
SE [µ](M2). Because we are interested in hardness, we focus
on the case where µ is the uniform distribution U . That
is, the results we prove for the specific case applies to the
general case. Also note that the comparison problem is no
harder than actually computing the quantitative information
flow because we can compare SE [µ](M1) and SE [µ](M2)
if we know their actual values.
Likewise, we study the hardness of the compar-
ison problem CME [µ], defined to be the problem
ME [µ](M1) ≤ ME [µ](M2), CGE [µ], defined to be the
problem GE [µ](M1) ≤ GE [µ](M2), and CCC , defined to
be the problem CC (M1) ≤ CC (M2). As with CSE [µ], we
require the two programs to share the same input domain
for these problems.
We show that none of these comparison problems are k-
safety problems for any k. Informally, a program property is
said to be a k-safety property [30], [9] if it can be refuted by
observing k number of (finite) execution traces. A k-safety
problem is the problem of checking a k-safety property.
Note that the standard safety property is a 1-safety property.
An important property of a k-safety problem is that it can
be reduced to a standard safety (i.e., 1-safety) problem,
such as the unreachability problem, via a simple program
transformation called self composition [3], [11].
It is well-known that non-interference is a 2-safety prop-
erty,4 and this has enabled its precise checking via a
reduction to a safety problem via self composition and
piggybacking on advances in automated safety verification
methods [30], [25], [32]. Unfortunately, the results in this
section imply that quantitative information flow inference
problem is unlikely to receive the same benefits.
Because we are concerned with properties about pairs of
programs (i.e., comparison problems), we extend the notion
of k-safety to properties refutable by observing k traces from
each of the two programs. More formally, we say that the
comparison problem C is a k-safety property if (M1,M2) 6∈
C implies that there exists T1 ⊆ [[M1]] and T2 ⊆ [[M2]] such
that
(1) |T1| ≤ k
(2) |T2| ≤ k
(3) ∀M ′1,M ′2.T1 ⊆ [[M ′1]] ∧ T2 ⊆ [[M ′2]]⇒ (M ′1,M ′2) 6∈ C
In the above, [[M ]] denotes the semantics (i.e., traces)
of M , represented by the set of input/output pairs
{((h, ℓ), o) | h ∈ H, ℓ ∈ L, o =M(h, ℓ)}.
We now state the main results of the section. (Recall that
U denotes the uniform distribution.) We sketch the main
idea of the proofs. All proofs are by contradiction. Let C
be the comparison problem in the statement and suppose C
is k-safety. Let (M1,M2) 6∈ C. Then, we have T1 ⊆ [[M1]]
and T2 ⊆ [[M2]] satisfying the properties (1), (2), and (3)
above. From this, we construct M¯1 and M¯2 such that T1 ⊆
[[M¯1]] and T2 ⊆ [[M¯2]] and (M¯1, M¯2) ∈ C to obtain the
contradiction.
Theorem 3.1: CSE [U ] is not a k-safety property for any
k > 0.
Theorem 3.2: CME [U ] is not a k-safety property for any
k > 0.
Theorem 3.3: CGE [U ] is not a k-safety property for any
k > 0.
4It is also well known that it is not a 1-safety property [23].
Theorem 3.4: CCC is not a k-safety property for any
k > 0.
A. Bounding the Domains
The notion of k-safety property, like the notion of safety
property from where it extends, is defined over all programs
regardless of their size. (For example, non-interference is a
2-safety property for all programs and unreachability is a
safety property for all programs.) But, it is easy to show
that the comparison problems would become “k-safety”
properties if we constrained and bounded the input domains
because then the size of the semantics (i.e., the input/output
pairs) of such programs would be bounded by |H| × |L|.
In this case, the problems are at most |H| × |L|-safety.5
However, these bounds are high for all but very small
domains, and are unlikely to lead to a practical verification
method.
B. Proof of Theorem 3.1
We discuss the details of the proof of Theorem 3.1. The
proofs of Theorems 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 are deferred to Appendix B.
For contradiction, suppose CSE [U ] is a k-safety property.
Let M and M ′ be programs having the same input domain
such that (M,M ′) 6∈ CSE [U ]. Then, it must be the case
that there exist T ⊆ [[M ]] and T ′ ⊆ [[M ′]] such that |T | ≤
k, |T ′| ≤ k, and ∀Mc,M ′c.T ⊆ [[Mc]] ∧ T ′ ⊆ [[M ′c]] ⇒
(Mc,M
′
c) 6∈ CSE [U ].
Let
T = {(h1, o1), (h2, o2), . . . , (hi, oi)}
T ′ = {(h′1, o
′
1), (h
′
2, o
′
2), . . . , (h
′
j , o
′
j)}
where i, j ≤ k. Now, we construct new programs M¯ and
M¯ ′ as follows.
M¯(h1) = o1 M¯ ′(h
′
1) = o
′
1
M¯(h2) = o2 M¯ ′(h
′
2) = o
′
2
. . . . . .
M¯(hi) = oi M¯ ′(h
′
j) = o
′
j
M¯(hi+1) = o M¯ ′(h
′
j+1) = o
′
j+1
M¯(hi+2) = o M¯ ′(h
′
j+2) = o
′
j+2
. . . . . .
M¯(hi+j) = o M¯ ′(h
′
j+i) = o
′
j+i
M¯(hi+j+1) = or M¯ ′(h
′
j+i+1) = o
′
r
. . . . . .
M¯(hn) = or M¯ ′(h
′
n) = o
′
r
where
• o 6= or,
• {o1, o2, . . . , oi} ∩ {o, or} = ∅,
• o′j+1, o
′
j+2, . . . , o
′
j+i, and o′r are distinct,
• {o′1, o
′
2, . . . , o
′
j} ∩ {o
′
j+1, . . . , o
′
j+i, o
′
r} = ∅,
• {h1, . . . , hn} = {h′1, . . . , h
′
n}, and
• n = 2k.
5It is possible to get a tighter bound for the channel-capacity based
definition by also bounding the size of the output domain.
M ::= x := ψ | if ψ then M elseM |M0;M1
φ, ψ ::= true | x | φ ∧ ψ | ¬φ
Figure 1. The syntax of loop-free boolean programs
wp(x := ψ, φ) = φ[ψ/x]
wp(if ψ then M0 else M1, φ)
= (ψ ⇒ wp(M0, φ)) ∧ (¬ψ ⇒ wp(M1, φ))
wp(M0;M1, φ) = wp(M0,wp(M1, φ))
Figure 2. The weakest precondition for loop-free boolean programs
Then, comparing the Shannon-entropy-based quantitative
information flow of M¯ and M¯ ′, we have,
SE [U ](M¯ ′)− SE [U ](M¯)
=
∑
o′x∈{o
′
1
,...,o′
i
} U(o
′
x) log
1
U(o′x)
+U(o′) log 1
U(o′) + U(o
′
r) log
1
U(o′r)
−(
∑
ox∈{o1,...,oj}
U(ox) log
1
U(ox)
+
∑
oy∈{oj+1,...,oj+i}
U(oy) log
1
U(oy)
+U(or) log
1
U(or)
)
(Note the abbreviations from Appendix A.) By lemma A.5,
we have
∑
ox∈{o1,...,oi}
U(ox) log
1
U(ox)
≤
∑
o′y∈{o
′
j+1
,...,o′
j+i
} U(o
′
y) log
1
U(o′y)
and
U(o) log 1
U(o) ≤
∑
o′x∈{o
′
1
,...,o′
j
} U(o
′
x) log
1
U(o′x)
Trivially, we have
U(o′r) log
1
U(o′r)
= U(or) log
1
U(or)
As a result, we have
SE [U ](M¯ ′)− SE [U ](M¯) ≥ 0
Note that M¯ and M¯ ′ have the same counterexamples T and
T ′, that is, T ⊆ [[M¯ ]] and T ′ ⊆ [[M¯ ′]]. However, we have
(M¯, M¯ ′) ∈ CSE [U ]. This leads to a contradiction.
C. Complexities for Loop-free Boolean Programs
The purpose of this section is to show a complexity
theoretic gap between non-interference and quantitative in-
formation flow. The results strengthen the hypothesis that
quantitative information flow is quite hard to compute pre-
cisely, and also suggest an interesting connection to counting
problems.
We focus on loop-free boolean programs whose syntax is
given in Figure 1. We assume the usual derived formulas
φ⇒ ψ, φ = ψ, φ∨ψ, and false. We give the usual weakest
precondition semantics in Figure 2.
To adapt the information flow framework to boolean pro-
grams, we make each information flow variable H , L, and O
range over functions mapping boolean variables of its kind to
boolean values. So, for example, if x and y are low security
boolean variables and z is a high security boolean variable,
then L ranges over the functions {x, y} → {false, true}, and
H and O range over {z} → {false, true}.6 (Every boolean
variable is either a low security boolean variable or a high
security boolean variable.) We write M(h, ℓ) = o for an
input (h, ℓ) and an output o if (h, ℓ) |= wp(M,φ) for a
boolean formula φ such that o |= φ and o′ 6|= φ for all output
o′ 6= o. Here, |= is the usual logical satisfaction relation,
using h, ℓ, o, etc. to look up the values of the boolean
variables. (Note that this incurs two levels of lookup.)
As an example, consider the following program.
M ≡
z := x;w := y;
if x ∧ y then z := ¬z else w := ¬w
Let x, y and w be high security variables and z be a low
security variable. Then,
SE [U ](M) = 1.5
ME [U ](M) = log 3
≈ 1.5849625
GE [U ](M) = 1.25
CC (M) = log 3
≈ 1.5849625
We prove the following hardness results. These results
are proven by a reduction from #SAT, which is the prob-
lem of counting the number of solutions to a quantifier-
free boolean formula. #SAT is known to be #P-complete.
Because #SAT is a function problem and the comparison
problems are decision problems, a step in the proofs makes
binary search queries to the comparison problem oracle a
polynomial number of times. (Recall that the notation FPA
means the complexity class of function problems solvable
in polynomial time with an oracle for the problem A.)
Theorem 3.5: #P ⊆ FPCSE [U ]
Theorem 3.6: #P ⊆ FPCME [U ]
Theorem 3.7: #P ⊆ FPCGE [U ]
Theorem 3.8: #P ⊆ FPCCC
We remind that the above results apply (even) when the
comparison problems CSE [U ], CME [U ], CGE [U ], and CCC
are restricted to loop-free boolean programs.
In summary, each comparison problem CSE [U ], CME [U ],
CGE [U ], and CCC can be used a polynomial number of
times to solve a #P-complete problem. Because Toda’s
theorem [31] implies that the entire polynomial hierarchy
can be solved by using a #P-complete oracle a polynomial
number of times, our results show that the comparison
problems for quantitative information flow can also be used
6 We do not distinguish input boolean variables from output boolean
variables. But, a boolean variable can be made output-only by assigning a
constant to the variable at the start of the program and made input-only by
assigning a constant at the end.
a polynomial number of times to solve the entire polynomial
hierarchy, for the case of loop-free boolean programs.
As shown below, this presents a gap from non-
interference, which is only coNP-complete for loop-free
boolean programs.
Theorem 3.9: Checking non-interference is coNP-
complete for loop-free boolean programs.
The above is an instance of the general observation that,
by solving quantitative information flow problems, one is
able to solve the class of problems known as counting
problems,7 which coincides with #SAT for the case of loop-
free boolean programs.
D. Proof of Theorem 3.5
We discuss the details of the proof of Theorem 3.5. The
proofs of Theorems 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 are deferred to Appendix B.
First, we prove the following lemma which states that we
can compare the number of solutions to boolean formulas
by computing SE [U ]. (For convenience, we use large letters
H , L, O, etc. to range over boolean variables as well as
generic random variables.)
Lemma 3.10: Let −→H and H ′ be distinct boolean random
variables. Let i and j be any non-negative integers such that
i ≤ 2|
−→
H | and j ≤ 2|
−→
H |
. Let ψi (resp. ψj) be a formula
over
−→
H having i (resp. j) assignments. Then, j ≤ i iff
SE [U ](Mj) ≤ SE [U ](Mi) where Mj ≡ O := ψj ∧ H ′
and Mi ≡ O := ψi ∧H ′.
Proof: Let p = i
2|H|+1
and q = j
2|H|+1
. We have
SE [U ](Mj) =
j
2|H|+1
log 2
|H|+1
j
+ 2
|H|+1−j
2|H|+1
log 2
|H|+1
2|H|+1−j
= p log p+ (1− p) log 11−p
SE [U ](Mi) =
i
2|H|+1
log 2
|H|+1
i
+ 2
|H|+1−i
2|H|+1
log 2
|H|+1
2|H|+1−i
= q log q + (1− q) log 11−q
• Only If
Suppose j ≤ i. Then,
SE [U ](Mi)− SE [U ](Mj)
= p log 1
p
+ (1− p) log 11−p
−q log 1
q
− (1− q) log 11−q
= log(1−p
p
)p 1−q1−p (
q
1−q )
q
Then, from 1−q1−p ≥ 1 and p ≥ q ≥ 0, we have
SE [U ](Mi)− SE [U ](Mj) ≥ log(
1−p
p
)p( q1−q )
q
≥ log(1−p
p
)q( q1−q )
q
= log( (1−p)q
p(1−q) )
q
= log( q−pq
p−pq )
q
= log( pq−q
pq−p )
q
= log(
1− 1
p
1− 1
q
)q
≥ 0
7Formally, a counting problem is the problem of counting the number of
solutions to a decision problem. For instance, #P is the class of counting
problems associated with NP.
The last line follows from 1−
1
p
1− 1
q
≥ 1.
• If
We prove the contraposition. Suppose j > i. Then,
SE [U ](Mj)− SE [U ](Mi)
= q log 1
q
+ (1− q) log 11−q
−p log 1
p
− (1− p) log 11−p
> 0
The last line follows from the fact that 0 ≤ p < q ≤ 12 .
Therefore, SE [U ](Mj) 6≤ SE [U ](Mi).
Then, using Lemma 3.10, we prove the following lemma
which is crucial to proving Theorem 3.5.
Lemma 3.11: Let −→H be distinct variables and φ be a
boolean formula over −→H . Then, the number of assignments
for φ can be computed by executing an oracle that decides
whether programs are in CSE [U ] at most 3 ∗ (|
−→
H |+ 1)+ 2
times.
Proof: First, we define a procedure that returns the
number of solutions of φ.
Let F (j) ≡ O := ψ ∧ H ′ where ψ is a formula over
−→
H
having j assignments and H ′ be a boolean variable such
that H ′ 6∈ {
−→
H}. Note that, by Lemma A.4, such ψ can be
generated in linear time.
Then, we invoke the following procedure where M ′ ≡
O′ := φ ∧H ′.
l = 0;
r = 2|
−→
H |;
n = (ℓ+ r)/2;
while ¬CSE [U ](F (n),M
′) ∨ ¬CSE [U ](M
′, F (n))
if CSE [U ](F (n),M
′)
then {ℓ = n;n = (ℓ+ r)/2; }
else {r = n;n = (ℓ+ r)/2; }
return n
Note that when the procedure terminates, we have
SE [U ](F (n)) = SE [U ](M ′), and so by Lemma 3.10, n
is the number of satisfying assignments to φ.
We show that the procedure iterates at most |−→H |+1 times.
To see this, every iteration in the procedure narrows the
range between r and ℓ by one half. Because r−ℓ is bounded
by 2|
−→
H |
, it follows that the procedure iterates at most |−→H |+1
times. Hence, the oracle CSE [U ] is accessed 3∗(|
−→
H |+1)+2
times, and this proves the lemma.
Finally, Theorem 3.5 follows from Lemma 3.11 and the
fact that #SAT, the problem of counting the number of
solutions to a boolean formula, is #P-complete.
IV. UNIVERSALLY QUANTIFYING DISTRIBUTIONS
As proved in Section III, precisely computing quantitative
information flow is quite difficult. Indeed, we have shown
that even just comparing two programs on which has the
larger flow is difficult (i.e., CSE , CME , CGE , and CCC ).
In this section, we show that universally quantifying
the Shannon-entropy based comparison problem CSE [µ],
the min-entropy based problem CME [µ], or the guessing-
entropy based problem CGE [µ] over the distribution µ is
equivalent to a simple relation R enjoying the following
properties.
(1) R is a 2-safety property.
(2) R is coNP-complete for loop-free boolean programs.
Note that (1) implies that we can actually check if
(M1,M2) ∈ CSE [µ] for all µ via self composition (and
likewise for CME [µ] and CGE [µ]). We actually show in
Section IV-B that we can even use the security-type-based
approach suggested by Terauchi and Aiken [30] to minimize
code duplication during self composition (i.e., do interleaved
self composition).
We remind that except for the coNP-completeness result
(Theorem 4.8), the results in this section apply to any
(deterministic and terminating) programs and not just to
loop-free boolean programs.
Definition 4.1: We define R to be the relation such that
R(M1,M2) iff for all ℓ ∈ L and h, h′ ∈ H, if M1(h, ℓ) 6=
M1(h
′, ℓ) then M2(h, ℓ) 6=M2(h′, ℓ).
Note that R(M1,M2) essentially says that if an attacker
can distinguish a pair of high security inputs by executing
M1, then she could do the same by executing M2. Hence,
R naturally expresses that M1 is at least as secure as M2. 8
It may be somewhat surprising that this simple relation
is actually equivalent to the rather complex entropy-based
quantitative information flow definitions when they are cast
as comparison problems and the distributions are universally
quantified, as stated in the following theorems. First, we
show that R coincides exactly with CSE with its distribution
universally quantified.
Theorem 4.2: R = {(M1,M2) | ∀µ.CSE [µ](M1,M2)}
The proof is detailed in Section IV-A. The next two theorems
show that R also coincides with CME and CGE with their
distribution universally quantified.
Theorem 4.3: R = {(M1,M2) | ∀µ.CME [µ](M1,M2)}
Theorem 4.4: R = {(M1,M2) | ∀µ.CGE [µ](M1,M2)}
The first half of the ⊆ direction of the proofs for the
theorems above is much like the that of Theorem 4.2, that
is, it makes the observation that M2 disambiguates the high
security inputs at least as fine as does M1. Then, the proof
concludes by utilizing the particular mathematical properties
relevant to the respective definitions. The proof for the ⊇
direction is also similar to the argument used in Theorem 4.2.
The details of the proofs appear in Appendix B.
Next, we show that R refines CCC in the sense that if
R(M1,M2) then CCC (M1,M2).
8We note that notions similar to R have appeared in literature (often in
somewhat different representations) [27], [18], [6]. In particular, Clark et
al. [6] have shown a result analogous to the ⊆ direction of Theorem 4.2
below. But, R’s properties have not been fully investigated.
Theorem 4.5: R ⊆ CCC
Note that, the other direction, R ⊇ CCC , does not hold as
R is not always a total order, whereas CCC is. We also show
that R is compatible with the notion of non-interference.
Theorem 4.6: Let M2 be a non-interferent program.
Then, R(M1,M2) iff M1 is also non-interferent and M1
has the same input domain as M2.
Next, we show that R is easier to decide than the non-
universally-quantified versions of the comparison problems.
First, it is trivial to see from Definition 4.1 that R is a 2-
safety property.
Theorem 4.7: R is a 2-safety property.
It can be shown that, restricted to loop-free boolean
programs, R is coNP-complete. This follows directly from
the observation that we can decide R by self composition
thanks to its 2-safety property and the fact that, for loop-free
boolean programs, self composition reduces the problem to
an UNSAT instance.9
Theorem 4.8: Restricted to loop-free boolean programs,
R is coNP-complete.
A. Proof of Theorem 4.2
We discuss the details of the proof of Theorem 4.2. The
proofs of Theorems 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 are deferred to Appendix B.
First, we prove the following lemma which says that,
if R(M,M ′) then SE [U ](M ′) is at least as large as
SE [U ](M) per each low security input ℓ ∈ L.
Lemma 4.9: Suppose R(M,M ′), that is, for all h1, h2
in H and ℓ in L, M ′(h1, ℓ) = M ′(h2, ℓ) ⇒ M(h1, ℓ) =
M(h2, ℓ). Let O be the set of the outputs of M , and
O′ be the set of the outputs of M ′. Then, for any ℓ, we
have
∑
o∈O µ(o, ℓ) log
µ(ℓ)
µ(o,ℓ) ≤
∑
o′∈O′ µ(o
′, ℓ) log µ(ℓ)
µ(o′,ℓ) .
(Recall the notational convention from Definition A.1.)
Proof: First, we prove for any output o of M , there
exist corresponding outputs Oo = {o′0, o′1, . . . , o′n} of M ′
such that
µ(o, ℓ) log µ(ℓ)
µ(o,ℓ)
≤
∑
o′r∈Oo
µ(o′r, ℓ) log
µ(ℓ)
µ(o′r,ℓ)
Let Ho be the set such that Ho = {h |M(h, ℓ) = o}.
Let {h0, h1, . . . , hn} = Ho. Let o′0 = M ′(h0, ℓ),. . . and,
o′n = M
′(hn, ℓ). For any h′ such that o′r =
M ′(h′, ℓ) and o′r ∈ {o′0, o′1, . . . , o′n}, we have h′ ∈
{h1, . . . , hn} since R(M,M ′). Then, we have µ(o, ℓ) =∑
o′r∈{o
′
1
,...,o′n}
µ(o′r, ℓ). By Lemma A.5, we have
µ(o, ℓ) log µ(ℓ)
µ(o,ℓ)
≤
∑
o′r∈{o
′
0
,o′
1
,...,o′n}
µ(o′r, ℓ) log
µ(ℓ)
µ(o′r,ℓ)
9To construct a polynomial size boolean formula from a loop-free
boolean program, we use the well-known efficient weakest precondition
construction technique [13], [17] instead of the naive rules given in Figure 2.
Now to prove the lemma, it suffices to show that each Oo
constructed above are disjoint. That is, for o1 and o2 outputs
of M such that o1 6= o2, Oo1 ∩Oo2 = ∅. For contradiction,
suppose o′ ∈ Oo1 ∩ Oo2 . Then, there exist h1 and h2 such
that o1 = M(h1, ℓ), o′ = M ′(h1, ℓ), o2 = M(h2, ℓ), and
o′ = M ′(h2, ℓ). Since R(M,M ′), we have o1 = o2, and it
leads to a contradiction. Hence, we have
∑
o
µ(o, ℓ) log
µ(ℓ)
µ(o, ℓ)
≤
∑
o′
µ(o′, ℓ) log
µ(ℓ)
µ(o′, ℓ)
We now prove Theorem 4.2.
Proof:
• ⊆
Suppose (M,M ′) ∈ R. By Lemma A.3,
SE [µ](M) = H[µ](O|L)
=
∑
ℓ
∑
o µ(o, ℓ) log
µ(ℓ)
µ(o,ℓ)
and
SE [µ](M ′) = H[µ](O′|L)
=
∑
ℓ
∑
o′ µ(o
′, ℓ) log µ(ℓ)
µ(o′,ℓ)
By Lemma 4.9 and the fact that (M,M ′) ∈ R, we
obtain for any ℓ
∑
o
µ(o, ℓ) log
µ(ℓ)
µ(o, ℓ)
≤
∑
o′
µ(o′, ℓ) log
µ(ℓ)
µ(o′, ℓ)
Hence,
∑
ℓ
∑
o µ(o, ℓ) log
µ(ℓ)
µ(o,ℓ)
≤
∑
ℓ
∑
o′ µ(o
′, ℓ) log µ(ℓ)
µ(o′,ℓ)
• ⊇
We prove the contraposition. Suppose (M,M ′) 6∈
R. Then, there exist o′, h0, h1, ℓ′ such that o′ =
M ′(h0, ℓ
′) = M ′(h1, ℓ
′) and M(h0, ℓ′) 6= M(h1, ℓ′).
Pick a probability function µ such that µ(h0, ℓ′) =
µ(h1, ℓ
′) = 12 .
Then, we have
H [µ](O′|L) =
∑
ℓ
∑
o µ(o, ℓ) log
µ(ℓ)
µ(o,ℓ)
= µ(o′, ℓ′) log µ(ℓ
′)
µ(o′,ℓ′)
= 1 log 11
= 0
Let o0 and o1 be output variables such that o0 =
M(h0, ℓ
′), o1 = M(h1, ℓ
′), and o0 6= o1.
H[µ](O|L) =
∑
o∈{o0,o1}
µ(o, ℓ′) log µ(ℓ
′)
µ(o,ℓ′)
= 12 log
1
1
2
+ 12 log
1
1
2
= 1
Therefore, SE [µ](M) 6≤ SE [µ](M ′), that is,
(M,M ′) 6∈ {(M1,M2) | ∀µ.(M1,M2) ∈ CSE [µ]}.
B. Quantitative Information Flow via Self Composition
Theorems 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.7 imply that we can check if
the entropy-based quantitative information flow of a program
(i.e., SE, ME, and GE) is bounded by that of another
for all distributions via self composition [3], [11]. This
suggests a novel approach to precisely checking quantitative
information flow.
That is, given a target program M1, the user would
construct a specification program M2 with the same input
domain as M1 having the desired level of security. Then, she
would check R(M1,M2) via self composition. If so, then
M1 is guaranteed to be at least as secure as M2 according to
the Shannon-entropy based, the min-entropy based, and the
guessing-entropy based definition of quantitative information
flow for all distributions (and also channel-capacity based
definition), and otherwise, there must be a distribution in
which M1 is less secure than M2 according to the entropy-
based definitions.
Note that deciding R(M1,M2) is useful even when
M1 and M2 are R-incomparable, that is, when neither
R(M1,M2) nor R(M2,M1). This is because ¬R(M1,M2)
implies that M1 is less secure than M2 on some distribution.
For example, suppose M1 is some complex login program
with the high security input H and the low security input
L. And we would like to verify that M1 is at least as secure
as the prototypical login program M2 below.
M2 ≡ if H = L then O := 0 else O := 1
Then, using this framework, it suffices to just query if
R(M1,M2) is true. (Note that the output domains of M1
and M2 need not to match.)
We now describe how to actually check R(M1,M2) via
self composition. From M1 and M2, we construct the self-
composed program M ′ shown below.
M ′(H,H ′, L) ≡
O1 :=M1(H,L);O
′
1 := M1(H
′, L); // L1
O2 :=M2(H,L);O
′
2 := M2(H
′, L); // L2
assert(O1 6= O′1 ⇒ O2 6= O
′
2)
Note that R(M1,M2) is true iff M ′ does not cause an
assertion failure. The latter can be checked via a software
safety verifier such as SLAM and BLAST [2], [15], [24], [4].
As an aside, we note that this kind of construction could
be easily generalized to reduce any k-safety problem (cf.
Section III) to a safety problem, as shown by Clarkson and
Schneider [9].
Note that the line L1 (resp. L2) of the pseudo code above
is M1 (resp. M2) sequentially composed with a copy of
itself, which is from where the name “self composition”
comes. Therefore, technically, M ′ is a composition of two
self compositions.
L1 (and L2) are actually exactly the original self compo-
sition proposed for non-interference [3], [11]. Terauchi and
Aiken [30] noted that only the parts of M1 (and M2) that
depend on the high security inputs H and H ′ need to be
duplicated and self composed, with the rest of the program
left intact and “interleaved” with the self-composed parts.
The resulting program tends to be verified easier than the
naive self composition by modern software safety verifiers.
They proposed a set of transformation rules that translates
a WHILE program annotated with security types [33] (or
dependency analysis results) to an interleaved self-composed
program. This was subsequently improved by a number
of researchers to support a richer set of language features
and transformation patterns [32], [25]. These transformation
methods can be used in place of the naive self compositions
at L1 and L2 in building M ′. That is, we apply a security
type inference (or a dependency analysis) to M1 and M2 to
infer program parts that depend on the high security inputs
H and H ′ so as to only duplicate and self compose those
parts of M1 and M2.
C. Example
We recall the ideal login program below.
Mspec ≡ if H = L then O := 0 else O := 1
We check the following four programs using the above as
the specification.
M1 ≡ O := H
M2 ≡ if H = L then O := 0 else O := H&1
M3 ≡ O := 1; i := 0;
while i < 32 {
m := 1 << i;
if H&m 6= L&m then
O := 0; break;
else
i++;
}
M4 ≡ O := 1; i := 0;
while i < 64 {
m := 1 << i;
if H&m 6= L&m then
O := 0; break;
else
i++;
}
Here, H and L are 64-bit values, & is the bit-wise and
operator, and << is the left shift operator. M1 leaks the entire
password. M2 checks the password against the user guess
but then leaks the first bit when the check fails. M3 only
checks the first 32 bits of the password. And, M4 implements
password checking correctly via a while loop.
We verify that only M4 satisfies the specification, that is,
R(M4,Mspec). To see that ¬R(M1,Mspec), note that for
any ℓ, h, h′ such that h 6= ℓ, h′ 6= ℓ and h 6= h′, we have that
M1(h, ℓ) 6= M1(h′, ℓ) but Mspec(h, ℓ) = Mspec(h′, ℓ) = 1.
To see that ¬R(M2,Mspec), note that for ℓ, h, h′ such that
h 6= ℓ, h′ 6= ℓ, h&1 = 1 and h′&1 = 0, we have
that 1 = M2(h, ℓ) 6= M2(h′, ℓ) = 0 but Mspec(h, ℓ) =
Mspec(h
′, ℓ) = 1. To see that ¬R(M3,Mspec), let ℓ, h, h′
be such that h|32 = ℓ|32, h′|32 6= ℓ|32, and h 6= ℓ,
then, 1 = M3(h, ℓ) 6= M3(h′, ℓ) = 0 but Mspec(h, ℓ) =
Mspec(h
′, ℓ) = 1.10 (Here, x|32 denotes x mod 232, i.e., the
first 32 bits of x.)
The results imply that for M1, M2, and M3, there must be
a distribution where the program is less secure than Mspec
according to each of the entropy-based definition of quantita-
tive information flow. For instance, for the Shannon-entropy
based definition, we have for the uniform distribution U ,
SE [U ](Mspec) =
1
258 +
264−1
264 log
264
264−1
≈ 3.46944695× 10−18
SE [U ](M1) = 64
SE [U ](M2) =
1
2 +
1+263
265 log
264
1+263 +
263−1
265 log
264
263−1
≈ 1.0
SE [U ](M3) =
1
227 +
264−232
264 log
264
264−232
≈ 7.78648× 10−9
That is, SE [U ](M1) 6≤ SE [U ](Mspec), SE [U ](M2) 6≤
SE [U ](Mspec), and SE [U ](M3) 6≤ SE [U ](Mspec).
Finally, we have that R(M4,Mspec), and so M4 is at least
as secure as Mspec according to all of the definitions of
quantitative information flow considered in this paper. In
fact, it can be also shown that R(Mspec,M4). (However,
note that M4 and Mspec are not semantically equivalent,
i.e., their outputs are reversed.)
V. RELATED WORK
This work builds on previous work that proposed informa-
tion theoretic notions of quantitative information flow [12],
[7], [19], [29], [16], [1], [22], [20], [26]. The previous
research has mostly focused on information theoretic proper-
ties of the definitions and proposed approximate (i.e., incom-
plete and/or unsound) methods for checking and inferring
them. In contrast, this paper investigates the verification
theoretic and complexity theoretic hardness of precisely
inferring quantitative information flow according to the
definitions and also proposes a precise method for check-
ing quantitative information flow. Our method checks the
quantitative information flow of a program against that of
a specification program having the desired level of security
via self composition for all distributions according to the
entropy-based definitions.
It is quite interesting that the relation R unifies the
different proposals for the definition of quantitative informa-
tion flow when they are cast as comparison problems and
10It can be also shown that ¬R(Mspec ,M2) and ¬R(Mspec ,M3), that
is, M2 and M3 are R-incomparable with Mspec .
their distributions are universally quantified. As remarked in
Section IV, R naturally expresses the fact that one program
is more secure than the other, and it could be argued that it
is the essence of quantitative information flow.
Researchers have also proposed definitions of quantitative
information flow that do not fit the models studied in this
paper. These include the definition based on the notion of
belief [8], and the ones that take the maximum over the low
security inputs [19], [16].11
Despite the staggering complexity made apparent in this
paper, recent attempts have been made to (more) precisely
infer quantitative information flow (without universally
quantifying over the distribution as in our approach). These
methods are based on the idea of counting. As remarked in
Section III-C, quantitative information flow is closely related
to counting problems, and several attempts have been made
to reduce quantitative information flow problems to them.12
For instance, Newsome et al. [26] reduce the inference
problem to the #SAT problem and apply off-the-shelf #SAT
solvers. To achieve scalability, they sacrifice both soundness
and completeness by only computing information flow from
one execution path. Backes et al. [1] also propose a counting-
based approach that involves self composition. However,
unlike our method, they use self composition repeatedly to
find a new solution (i.e., more than a bounded number of
times), and so their results do not contradict the negative
results of this paper.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have investigated the hardness and possibilities of pre-
cisely checking and inferring quantitative information flow
according to the various definitions proposed in literature.
Specifically, we have considered the definitions based on
the Shannon entropy, the min entropy, the guessing entropy,
and channel capacity.
We have shown that comparing two programs on which
has the larger flow according to these definitions is not
a k-safety problem for any k, and therefore that it is
not possible to reduce the problem to a safety problem
via self composition. The result is in contrast to non-
interference which is a 2-safety problem. We have also
shown a complexity theoretic gap with non-interference by
proving the #P-hardness of the comparison problems and
coNP-completeness of non-interference, when restricted to
loop-free boolean programs.
We have also shown a positive result that checking if the
entropy-based quantitative information flow of one program
is larger than that of another for all distributions is a 2-safety
11It is actually possible to show that the relation R refines these notions
in the same sense as Theorem 4.5, but the other direction is not guaranteed
to hold.
12Note that our results only show that, restricted to loop-free boolean
programs, the comparison problems can be reduced from #SAT, and they
do not show how to reduce them (or more general cases) to #SAT or other
counting problems.
problem, and that it is also coNP-complete when restricted
to loop-free boolean programs.
We have done this by proving a surprising result that
universally quantifying the distribution in the comparison
problem for the entropy-based definitions is equivalent to
a simple 2-safety relation. Motivated by the result, we have
proposed a novel approach to precisely checking quantitative
information flow that reduces the problem to a safety prob-
lem via self composition. Our method checks the quantitative
information flow of a program for all distributions against
that of a specification program having the desired level of
security.
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APPENDIX A.
SUPPORTING DEFINITIONS AND LEMMAS
We define some abbreviations.
Definition A.1: µ(x) , µ(X = x)
We use this notation whenever the correspondences between
random variables and their values are clear.
For convenience, we sometimes use large letters H , L,
O, etc. to range over boolean variables as well as generic
random variables.
For simplicity, we often compute the Shannon-entropy
based quantitative information flow for programs that do not
have low security inputs. For such programs, the equation
SE from Definition 2.4 can be simplified as follows.
Lemma A.2:
SE [µ](M) = I[µ](O;H)
= H[µ](O)
We note the following property of deterministic pro-
grams [5].
Lemma A.3: For M deterministic,
SE [µ](M) = I[µ](O;H |L) = H[µ](O|L)
The following lemma is used to show that we can generate
a boolean formula that has exactly the desired number of
solutions in polynomial (actually, linear) time.
Lemma A.4: Let k be an integer such that 0 ≤ k ≤
2|
−→x | − 1. Then, a boolean formula that has exactly k
assignments over the variables −→x can be computed in time
linear in |−→x |.
Proof: We define a procedure iter that returns the
boolean formula. Below, −→x = x1, x2, . . . , i.e., xi is the
ith variable.
iter(ǫ, 0) = false
iter(0ℓ, i) = xi ∧ (iter(ℓ, i− 1))
iter(1ℓ, i) = xi ∨ (iter(ℓ, i− 1))
Here, ǫ is an empty string. Let ℓk be a |−→x |-bit binary
representation of k. We prove that iter(ℓk, |−→x |) returns a
boolean formula that has exactly k assignments by induction
on the number of variables, that is, |−→x |.
• |−→x | = 1
– k = 0
iter(0, 1) returns x1 ∧ false, that is, false. false has
no satisfying assignment.
– k = 1
iter(1, 1) returns x1∨ false, that is, x1. x1 has only
one satisfying assignment.
• |−→x , x′|
– k < 2|
−→x ,x′|−1
Let 0ℓ be a binary representation of k.
iter(0ℓ, |−→x , x′|) returns x′ ∧ iter(ℓ, |−→x |). By
induction hypothesis, iter(ℓ, |−→x |) has k satisfying
assignments for −→x . It follows that x′∧ iter(ℓ, |−→x |)
has just k satisfying assignments, because
false ∧ iter(ℓ, |−→x |) has no assignment and
true ∧ iter(ℓ, |−→x |) has just k assignments.
– k ≥ 2|
−→x |
Let 1ℓ be a binary representation of k.
iter(1ℓ, |−→x , x′|) returns x′ ∨ iter(ℓ, |−→x |). ℓ is
a binary representation of k − 2|−→x |. By induction
hypothesis, iter(ℓ, |−→x |) has k − 2|−→x | satisfying
assignments for −→x . It follows that x′∨ iter(ℓ, |−→x |)
has just k satisfying assignments, because
false ∨ iter(ℓ, |−→x |) has just k − 2|−→x | assignments
and when x′ = true, x′ ∨ iter(ℓ, |−→x |) has just 2|−→x |
assignments.
We frequent the following property of logarithmic arith-
metic when proving statements concerning the Shannon
entropy.
Lemma A.5: Let p and q be numbers such that p, q ∈
[0, 1]. Then, we have p log 1
p
+ q log 1
q
≥ (p+ q) log 1
p+q .
Proof: Because p+q
p
≥ 1 and p+q
q
≥ 1, it follows that,
p log 1
p
+ q log 1
q
− (p+ q) log 1
p+q
= p log 1
p
− p log 1
p+q + q log
1
q
− q log 1
p+q
= p log p+q
p
+ q log p+q
q
≥ 0
APPENDIX B.
OMITTED PROOFS
Theorem 2.6: Let M be a program that takes high-
security input H , low-security input L, and returns low-
security output O. Then, M is non-interferent if and only if
∀µ.SE [µ](M) = 0.
Proof: Recall that M is non-interferent iff for any
h, h′ ∈ H and ℓ ∈ L, M(h, ℓ) =M(h′, ℓ).
• (⇒) Suppose that M is non-interferent. Then, by
Lemma A.3,
SE [µ](M) = I[µ](O;H |L)
= H[µ](O|L)
=
∑
o
∑
ℓ µ(o, ℓ) log
µ(ℓ)
µ(o,ℓ)
=
∑
o
∑
ℓ µ(o, ℓ) log
µ(ℓ)
µ(ℓ)
= 0
The last step follows from the fact that non-interference
implies µ(ℓ) = µ(o, ℓ).
• (⇐) Suppose that M is interferent. Then, there must be
h0 and h1 such that M(h0, ℓ′) = o0, M(h1, ℓ′) = o1,
and o0 6= o1. Pick a probability function µ such that
µ(h0, ℓ
′) = µ(h1, ℓ
′) = 12 . Then, by Lemma A.3,
SE [µ](M) = I[µ](O;H |L)
= H[µ](O|L)
=
∑
o
∑
ℓ µ(o, ℓ) log
µ(ℓ)
µ(o,ℓ)
= µ(o0, ℓ
′) log µ(ℓ
′)
µ(o0,ℓ′)
+µ(o1, ℓ
′) log µ(ℓ
′)
µ(o1,ℓ′)
= 12 log 2 +
1
2 log 2
= 1
Therefore, there exists µ such that SE [µ](M) 6= 0, and
we have the conclusion.
We note the following equivalence of CC and ME[U] for
programs without low security inputs [29].
Lemma B.1: Let M be a program without low security
input. Then, ME [U ](M) = CC (M).
The min-entropy-based quantitative information flow with
uniformly distributed high security input has the following
property [29].
Lemma B.2: Let M be a program without low security
input and O be the output of M . Then, ME [U ](M) =
log(|O|).
Theorem 3.2: CME [U ] is not a k-safety property for any
k > 0.
Proof: For contradiction, suppose CME [U ] is a k-safety
property. Let M and M ′ be programs having same input
domain such that (M,M ′) 6∈ CME [U ]. Then, it must be the
case that there exist T ⊆ [[M ]] and T ′ ⊆ [[M ′]] such that
|T | ≤ k, |T ′| ≤ k, and ∀Mc,M ′c.T ⊆ [[Mc]]∧T ′ ⊆ [[M ′c]]⇒
(Mc,M
′
c) 6∈ CME [U ].
Let
T = {(h1, o1), (h2, o2), . . . , (hi, oi)}
T ′ = {(h′1, o
′
1), (h
′
2, o
′
2), . . . , (h
′
j , o
′
j)}
where i, j ≤ k. Now, we construct new programs M¯ and
M¯ ′ as follows.
M¯(h1) = o1 M¯ ′(h
′
1) = o
′
1
M¯(h2) = o2 M¯ ′(h
′
2) = o
′
2
. . . . . .
M¯(hi) = oi M¯ ′(h
′
j) = o
′
j
M¯(hi+1) = o M¯ ′(h
′
j+1) = o
′
j+1
M¯(hi+2) = o M¯ ′(h
′
j+2) = o
′
j+2
. . . . . .
M¯(hn) = o M¯ ′(h
′
n) = o
′
n
where
• o′j+1, o
′
j+2, . . . , and o′n are distinct,
• {o′1, o
′
2, . . . , o
′
j} ∩ {o
′
j+1, . . . , o
′
n} = ∅,
• {h1, . . . , hn} = {h′1, . . . , h
′
n}, and
• n = 2k.
The number of outputs of the program M¯ ′ is greater than
or equal to the number of the outputs of the program M¯ .
Hence, by Lemma B.2, we have (M¯, M¯ ′) ∈ CME [U ]. But,
T ⊆ [[M¯ ]] and T ′ ⊆ [[M¯ ′]]. This leads to a contradiction.
Definition B.3:
In(µ,X, x) = |{x′ ∈ X | µ(x′) ≥ µ(x)}|
Intuitively, In(µ,X, x) is the order of x defined in terms of
µ.
Lemma B.4:
G[µ](X) = Σ1≤i≤|X|iµ(xi)
= Σx∈XIn(µ,X, x)µ(x)
Proof: Trivial.
Lemma B.5: Let µ be a function such that µ : D →
[0, 1]. Let P and Q be sets such that P ∪ Q = D and
P ∩ Q = ∅. Then, we have
∑
x∈D In(µ,D, x)µ(x) ≥∑
p∈P In(µ, P, p)µ(p) +
∑
q∈Q In(µ,Q, q)µ(q).
Proof: Trivial.
Definition B.6: Let M be a function such that M : A→
B. For any o ∈ B, we define M−1(o) to mean
M−1(o) = {i ∈ A | o =M(i)}
Theorem 3.3: CGE [U ] is not a k-safety property for any
k > 0
Proof: For contradiction, suppose CGE [U ] is a k-safety
property. Let M and M ′ be programs having the same input
domain such that (M,M ′) 6∈ CGE [U ]. Then, it must be the
case that there exist T ⊆ [[M ]] and T ′ ⊆ [[M ′]] such that
|T | ≤ k, |T ′| ≤ k, and ∀Mc,M ′c.T ⊆ [[Mc]]∧T ′ ⊆ [[M ′c]]⇒
(Mc,M
′
c) 6∈ CGE [U ].
Let
T = {(h1, o1), (h2, o2), . . . , (hi, oi)}
T ′ = {(h′1, o
′
1), (h
′
2, o
′
2), . . . , (h
′
j , o
′
j)}
where i, j ≤ k. Now, we construct new programs M¯ and
M¯ ′ as follows.
M¯(h1) = o1 M¯ ′(h
′
1) = o
′
1
M¯(h2) = o2 M¯ ′(h
′
2) = o
′
2
. . . . . .
M¯(hi) = oi M¯ ′(h
′
j) = o
′
j
M¯(hi+1) = o M¯ ′(h
′
j+1) = o
′
j+1
M¯(hi+2) = o M¯ ′(h
′
j+2) = o
′
j+2
. . . . . .
M¯(hi+j) = o M¯ ′(h
′
j+i) = o
′
j+i
M¯(hi+j+1) = or M¯ ′(h
′
j+i+1) = o
′
r
. . . . . .
M¯(hn) = or M¯ ′(h
′
n) = o
′
r
where
• o 6= or,
• {o1, o2, . . . , oi} ∩ {o, or} = ∅,
• o′j+1, o
′
j+2, . . . , o
′
j+i, and o′r are distinct,
• {o′1, o
′
2, . . . , o
′
j} ∩ {o
′
j+1, . . . , o
′
j+i, o
′
r} = ∅,
• {h1, . . . , hn} = {h′1, . . . , h
′
n}, and
• n = 2k.
We compare the guessing-entropy-based quantitative infor-
mation flow of the two programs.
GE [U ](M¯ ′)−GE [U ](M¯)
= |H|2 −
1
2|H|
∑
o′∈M ′(H) |M
′−1(o′)|2
− |H|2 +
1
2|H|
∑
o∈M(H) |M
−1(o)|2
= 12|H|
∑
o∈M(H) |M
−1(o)|2
− 12|H|
∑
o′∈M ′(H) |M
′−1(o′)|2
= 12|H| (
∑
ox∈{o1,...,oi}
|M−1(ox)|
2
+|M−1(o)|2 + |M−1(or)|2)
− 12|H| (
∑
o′x∈{o
′
1
,...,o′
j
} |M
′−1(o′x)|
2
+
∑
o′y∈{o
′
j+1
,...,o′
j+i
} |M
′−1(o′y)|
2
+|M ′−1(o′r)|
2)
By lemma B.5, we have
∑
ox∈{o1,...,oi}
|M−1(ox)|
2
≤
∑
o′y∈{o
′
j+1
,...,o′
j+i
} |M
′−1(o′x)|
2
and
|M−1(o)|2 ≤
∑
o′x∈{o
′
1
,...,o′
j
} |M
′−1(o′x)|
2
Trivially, we have
|M ′−1(o′r)|
2 = |M−1(or)|
2
T (φ) =
if φ
then Of := true;
−→
O :=
−→
H
else Of := false;
−→
O :=
−−→
false
where Of and
−→
O are distinct.
Figure 3. Boolean formula encoding by boolean program
As a result, we have
GE [U ](M¯ ′)−GE [U ](M¯) ≥ 0
Recall that M¯ and M¯ ′ have the same counterexamples T
and T ′, that is, T ⊆ [[M¯ ]] and T ′ ⊆ [[M¯ ′]]. However, we
have (M¯, M¯ ′) ∈ CGE [U ]. This leads to a contradiction.
Theorem 3.4: CCC is not a k-safety property for any
k > 0.
Proof: Straightforward from Lemma B.1 and Theo-
rem 3.2.
Lemma B.7: Let
−→
H be distinct boolean variables, φ be a
boolean formula over −→H , and n be the number of satisfying
assignments for φ. If n is less than 2|−→H |, then the number of
the outputs of the boolean program T (φ) defined in Figure 3
is equal to n+ 1.
Proof: Trivial.
Lemma B.8: Let −→H be distinct variables and φ be a
boolean formula over −→H . Then, the number of assignments
for φ can be computed by executing an oracle that decides
whether programs are in CME [U ] at most 3 ∗ (|
−→
H |+1)+2
times.
Proof: First, we define a procedure that returns the
number of solutions for φ.
Let B(j) = ψ ∧H ′ where ψ is a formula over
−→
H having
j assignments and H ′ is a boolean variable such that H ′ 6∈
{
−→
H}. Note that by Lemma A.4, such ψ can be generated in
linear time.
Then, we invoke the following procedure where T is
defined in Figure 3.
ℓ = 0;
r = 2|
−→
H |;
n = (ℓ+ r)/2;
while ¬((T (φ ∧H ′), T (B(n))) ∈ CME [U ]
and (T (B(n)), T (φ ∧H ′)) ∈ CME [U ])
if (T (φ ∧H ′), T (B(n))) ∈ CME [U ]
then {ℓ = n;n = (ℓ + r)/2; }
else {r = n;n = (ℓ + r)/2; }
return n
Note that when the procedure terminates, we have
ME [U ](T (B(n)) = ME [U ](T (φ ∧ H ′)), and so by
Lemma B.2 and Lemma B.7, n is the number of satisfying
assignments to φ.
We show that the procedure iterates at most |−→H |+1 times.
To see this, note that every iteration in the procedure narrows
the range between r and ℓ by one half. Because r − ℓ is
bounded by 2|
−→
H |
, it follows that the procedure iterates at
most |
−→
H |+ 1 times. Hence, the oracle CME [U ] is accessed
3 ∗ (|
−→
H |+ 1) + 2 times, and this proves the lemma.
Theorem 3.6: #P ⊆ FPCME [U ]
Proof: Straightforward by Lemma B.8 and the fact that
#SAT, the problem of counting the number of solutions to a
boolean formula, is #P-complete.
Lemma B.9: Let −→H and H ′ be distinct variables and φ
and φ′ be boolean formulas over −→H . Let M ≡ O := φ∧H ′
and M ′ ≡ O := φ′ ∧ H ′. Then, we have #SAT (φ) ≤
#SAT (φ′) iff GE [U ](M) ≤ GE [U ](M ′).
Proof: By the definition,
GE [U ](M) = G(H)− G(H |O)
= 12 (|
−→
H |) + 12 −
∑
o
∑
1≤i≤|
−→
H |
iU(hi, o)
= |
−→
H |
2
− 1
2|
−→
H |
(|M−1(true)|2 + |M−1(false)|2)
Therefore,
GE [U ](M) ≤ GE [U ](M ′)
iff
|M−1(true)|2 + |M−1(false)|2
≥ |M ′−1(true)|2 + |M ′−1(false)|2
But, trivially, the latter holds iff
#SAT (φ) ≤ #SAT (φ′)
Lemma B.10: Let −→H and H ′ be distinct variables and
φ be a boolean formula over −→H . Then, the number of
assignments for φ can be computed by executing an oracle
that decides whether programs are in CGE [U ] at most
3 ∗ (|
−→
H |+ 1) + 2 times.
Proof: First, we define a procedure that returns the
number of solutions for φ.
Let B(j) = ψ ∧H ′ where ψ is a formula over
−→
H having
j assignments and H ′ is a boolean variable such that H ′ 6∈
{
−→
H}. Note that by Lemma A.4, such ψ can be generated in
linear time.
ℓ = 0;
r = 2|
−→
H |;
n = (ℓ + r)/2;
while ¬(O := φ ∧H ′, O := B(n)) ∈ CGE [U ]
and (O := B(n), O := φ ∧H ′) ∈ CGE [U ])
if (O := φ ∧H ′, O := B(n)) ∈ CGE [U ]
then {ℓ = n;n = (ℓ+ r)/2; }
else {r = n;n = (ℓ+ r)/2; }
return n
Note that when this procedure terminates, we have
GE [U ](O := B(n)) = GE [U ](O := φ ∧ H ′), and so by
Lemma B.9, n is the number of satisfying assignments to
φ.
We show that the procedure iterates at most |−→H |+1 times.
To see this, every iteration in the procedure narrows the
range between r and ℓ by one half. Because r−ℓ is bounded
by 2|
−→
H |
, it follows that the procedure iterates at most |−→H |+1
times. Hence, the oracle CGE [U ] is accessed 3∗(|
−→
H |+1)+2
times, and this proves the lemma.
Theorem 3.7: #P ⊆ FPCGE [U ]
Proof: Straightforward by Lemma B.10 and the fact
that #SAT, the problem of counting the number of solutions
to a boolean formula, is #P-complete.
Theorem 3.8: #P ⊆ FPCCC
Proof: Straightforward from Lemma B.1 and Theo-
rem 3.6.
Theorem 3.9: Checking non-interference is coNP-
complete for loop-free boolean programs.
Proof: We write NI for the decision problem of check-
ing non-interference of loop-free boolean programs. We
prove by reducing NI to and from UNSAT, which is coNP-
complete.
• NI ⊆ UNSAT
We reduce via self composition [3], [11]. Let M be
a boolean program that we want to know if it is non-
interferent. First, we make a copy of M , with each
variable x in M replaced by a fresh (primed) variable
x′. Call this copy M ′. Let φ = wp(M ;M ′,−→O = −→O ′),
where
−→
O =
−→
O ′ is the boolean formula encoding the
conjunction of equalities O1 = O′1, O2 = O′2, . . . ,
On = O
′
n, where O1, . . . , On are the low security
output variables of M . Note that φ can be obtained
in time polynomial in the size of M . Here, instead of
the rules in Figure 2, we use the optimized weakest
precondition generation technique [13], [17] that gen-
erates a formula quadratic in the size of M ;M ′. Then,
M is non-interferent if and only if φ is valid, that is,
if and only if ¬φ is unsatisfiable.
• UNSAT ⊆ NI
Let φ be a formula that we want to know if it is
unsatisfiable. We prove that the following programs is
non-interferent iff φ is unsatisfiable. Here, all variables
that appear in φ are high security input variables and
H is a high security input variable that is distinct from
variables appearing in φ, and O is the low security
output variable.
if φ ∧H then O := true else O := false
Trivially, if φ is unsatisfiable, then this program returns
only false, that is, this program is non-interferent. If this
program is non-interferent, then this program returns
only true for any input, or returns only false for any
input. However, this program can not return only true,
because if H = false then φ ∧ H = false. Therefore,
this program only returns false, when this program is
non-interferent. That means φ is unsatisfiable when the
program is non-interferent.
Definition B.11: Let M be a function such that M : A→
B. Then, we define the image of M on X ⊆ A, M [X], as
follows.
M [X] = {o | o =M(x) ∧ x ∈ X}
Lemma B.12: Let H be a set, and M and M ′ be
functions whose domains contain H. Suppose that we
have M ′(h0, l) = M ′(h1, l) ⇒ M(h0, l) = M(h1, l),
for all h0, h1 in H. Then, for all h′ ∈ H, we have
{h |M ′(h, l) = M ′(h′, l)} ⊆ {h |M(h, l) =M(h′, l)}.
Proof: Trivial.
Lemma B.13: Let H , O, O′, and L be distinct ran-
dom variables. Let M and M ′ be programs. We have
(M,M ′) ∈ R iff for any distribution µ, H∞[µ](H |O′, L) ≤
H∞[µ](H |O,L) where O′ = M ′(H,L) and O = M(H,L).
Proof:
• (⇒)
Suppose R(M,M ′). We have
H∞[µ](H |O′, L) ≤ H∞[µ](H |O,L)
iff V [µ](H |O,L) ≤ V [µ](H |O′, L)
by the definition of min entropy, and
V [µ](H |O,L)
=
∑
o∈O,ℓ∈L µ(o, ℓ)maxh∈H µ(h|o, ℓ)
=
∑
o∈O,ℓ∈L µ(o, ℓ)maxh∈H
µ(h,o,ℓ)
µ(o,ℓ)
=
∑
o∈O,ℓ∈Lmaxh∈H µ(o, ℓ)
µ(h,o,ℓ)
µ(o,ℓ)
=
∑
o∈O,ℓ∈Lmaxh∈H µ(h, o, ℓ)
=
∑
o∈O,ℓ∈Lmaxh∈{h′|o=M(h′,ℓ)} µ(h, ℓ)
where O = M [{(h, ℓ) ∈ H× L | µ(h, l) > 0}], and L
and H are sample spaces of low-security input and
high-security input, respectively. Therefore, it suffices
to show that
V [µ](H |O′, L)− V [µ](H |O,L)
=
∑
o′∈O′,ℓ∈Lmaxh∈{h′|o′=M ′(h′,ℓ)} µ(h, ℓ)
−
∑
o∈O,ℓ∈Lmaxh∈{h′|o=M(h′,ℓ)} µ(h, ℓ)
≥ 0
where O′ =M ′[{(h, ℓ) ∈ H× L | µ(h, ℓ) > 0}].
For any o ∈ O and ℓ ∈ L, there exists hm such
that µ(hm, ℓ) = maxh∈{h′|o=M(h′,ℓ)} µ(h, ℓ). Because
R(M,M ′), by Lemma B.12, we have
{h |M ′(h, ℓ) =M ′(hm, ℓ)}
⊆ {h |M(h, ℓ) = M(hm, ℓ)}
Therefore,
µ(hm, ℓ) = max
h∈{h′|o′=M ′(h′,ℓ)}
µ(h, ℓ)
for some o′ ∈ O′. Hence, each summand in∑
o∈O,ℓ∈Lmaxh∈{h′|o=M(h′,ℓ)} µ(h, ℓ) also appears
in
∑
o′∈O′,ℓ∈Lmaxh∈{h′|o′=M ′(h′,ℓ)} µ(h, ℓ). And, we
have the above proposition.
• (⇐)
We prove the contraposition. Suppose (M,M ′) 6∈ R.
Then, there exist h0, h1, ℓ, o0, o1 such that M ′(h0, ℓ) =
M ′(h1, ℓ), o0 = M(h0, ℓ), o1 = M(h1, ℓ), and
o0 6= o1. Pick a probability distribution µ such that
µ(h0, ℓ) = µ(h1, ℓ) =
1
2 . Then, we have
V [µ](H |O′, L)
=
∑
o′∈O′,ℓ∈Lmaxh∈{h′|o′=M(h′,ℓ)} µ(h, ℓ)
= 12
and
V [µ](H |O,L)
=
∑
o∈O,ℓ∈Lmaxh∈{h′|o=M(h′,ℓ)} µ(h, ℓ)
= 12 +
1
2
= 1
Therefore, H∞[µ](H |O′, L) 6≤ H∞[µ](H |O,L).
Theorem 4.3: R = {(M1,M2) | ∀µ.CME [µ](M1,M2)}
Proof: Straightforward from Lemma B.13 and the fact
that H∞[µ](H |L) − H∞[µ](H |O,L) ≤ H∞[µ](H |L) −
H∞[µ](H |O′, L) iff H∞[µ](H |O,L) ≥ H∞[µ](H |O′, L).
Theorem 4.4: R = {(M1,M2) | ∀µ.CGE [µ](M1,M2)}
Proof:
• ⊆
Suppose (M,M ′) ∈ R. By the definition,
GE [µ](M) =∑
ℓ∈L,h∈H In(λh
′.µ(h′, ℓ),H, h)µ(h, ℓ)
−
∑
o∈O,ℓ∈L,h∈H In(λh
′.µ(h′, o, ℓ),H, h)µ(h, o, ℓ)
and
GE [µ](M ′) =∑
ℓ∈L,h∈H In(λh
′.µ(h′, ℓ),H, h)µ(h, ℓ)
−
∑
o′∈O′,ℓ∈L,h∈H In(λh
′.µ(h′, o′, ℓ),H, h)µ(h, o′, ℓ)
where O = M [{(h, ℓ) ∈ H× L | µ(h, ℓ) > 0}] and
O′ =M ′[{(h, ℓ) ∈ H× L | µ(h, ℓ) > 0}].
It suffices to show that
∑
o′∈O′,ℓ∈L,h∈H In(λh
′.µ(h′, o′, ℓ),H, h)µ(h, o′, ℓ)
≤
∑
o∈O,ℓ∈L,h∈H In(λh
′.µ(h′, o, ℓ),H, h)µ(h, o, ℓ)
Let o ∈ O and ℓ ∈ L. Let o = M(h0, ℓ) = · · · =
M(hx, ℓ), and let o′0 =M ′(h0, ℓ), . . . , o′x = M ′(hx, ℓ).
Because R(M,M ′), for any h′ such that M ′(h′, ℓ) ∈
{o′0, . . . , o
′
x}, we have h′ ∈ {h0, . . . , hx}. Then, by
Lemma B.5, we have
∑
h∈HO
In(λh′.µ(h′, o′, ℓ),H, h)µ(h, o, ℓ)
≥
∑
o′∈O′o,h∈Ho
In(λh′.µ(h′, o′, ℓ),H, h)µ(h, o′, ℓ)
where
O′o = {o
′
0, . . . , o
′
x}
Ho = {h0, h1, . . . , hx}
Now we prove each Oo constructed above are disjoint.
That is, for o1 and o2 outputs of M such that o1 6=
o2, Oo1 ∩ Oo2 = ∅. For a contradiction, suppose o′ ∈
Oo1 ∩Oo2 . Then, there exist h1 and h2 such that o1 =
M(h1, ℓ), o
′ = M ′(h1, ℓ), o2 = M(h2, ℓ), and o′ =
M ′(h2, ℓ). Since R(M,M ′), we have o1 = o2, and it
leads to a contradiction. Hence, we have for any ℓ ∈ L,
∑
o′∈O′,h∈H In(λh
′.µ(h′, o′, ℓ),H, h)µ(h, o′, ℓ)
≤
∑
o∈O,h∈H In(λh
′.µ(h′, o, ℓ),H, h)µ(h, o, ℓ)
Therefore, it follows that
∑
o′∈O′,ℓ∈L,h∈H In(λh
′.µ(h′, o′, ℓ),H, h)µ(h, o′, ℓ)
≤
∑
o∈O,ℓ∈L,h∈H In(λh
′.µ(h′, o, ℓ),H, h)µ(h, o, ℓ)
• ⊇
We prove the contraposition. Suppose (M,M ′) 6∈ R.
Then, there exist h, h′, ℓ, o, o′ such that
– M(h, ℓ) = o, M(h′, ℓ) = o′, and o 6= o′
– M ′(h, ℓ) = M ′(h′, ℓ)
Then, we can pick µ such that µ(h, ℓ) = µ(h′, ℓ) = 0.5.
We have
GE [µ](M) = 1.5− 1 = 0.5
and
GE [µ](M ′) = 1.5− 1.5 = 0
Therefore, we have (M,M ′) 6∈ CGE [µ].
Theorem 4.5: R ⊆ CCC
Proof: Let M and M ′ be programs such that
(M,M ′) ∈ R. We prove (M,M ′) ∈ CCC .
By Theorem 4.2, we have
∀µ.SE [µ](M) ≤ SE [µ](M ′)
Now, there exists µ′ such that
CC (M) = SE [µ′](M)
Therefore,
SE [µ′](M) ≤ SE [µ′](M ′)
Trivially,
SE [µ′](M ′) ≤ CC (M ′)
Therefore, we have the conclusion.
Theorem 4.6: Let M2 be a non-interferent program.
Then, R(M1,M2) iff M1 is also non-interferent and M1
has the same input domain as M2.
Proof: Straightforward from Theorems 2.6 and 4.2.
Theorem 4.8: Restricted to loop-free boolean programs,
R is coNP-complete.
Proof:
• R ⊆ coNP
We prove by reducing R to UNSAT, which is coNP-
complete. We reduce via self composition [3], [11].
Let M and M ′ be boolean programs that we want to
know if they are in R. First, we make copies of M
and M ′, with all variables in M and M ′ replaced by
fresh (primed) variables. Call these copies Mc and M ′c.
Let φ = wp(M ;Mc;M ′;M ′c,
−→
O′ =
−→
O′c ⇒
−→
O =
−→
Oc)
where
−→
O ,
−→
Oc,
−→
O′, and
−→
O′c are the low security outputs
of M ,Mc,M ′, and M ′c, respectively. Note that φ can
be obtained in time polynomial in the size of M
and M ′. Here, like in Theorem 3.9, we use the opti-
mized weakest precondition generation technique [13],
[17] to generate a formula quadratic in the size of
M ;Mc;M
′;M ′c. Then, (M,M ′) ∈ R if and only if
φ is valid, that is, if and only if ¬φ is unsatisfiable.
• coNP ⊆ R
We prove by reducing NI to R, because NI is coNP-
complete by Theorem 3.9. We can check the non-
interference of M by solving R(M,M ′) where M ′ is
non-interferent and have the same input domain as M
by Theorem 4.6. Note that such M ′ can be constructed
in polynomial time. Therefore, we have coNP ⊆ R.
